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CHAPTER

20 Documentary Listening Habits: From Voice to Audibility



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Abstract

This chapter rethinks the documentary field's prevailing metaphor for a film's social perspective —“voice”—in conjunction with the “auditory turn” in media and cultural theory. Drawing on terms like “listening ear” (Jennifer Lynn Stoeber), “audit” (John Mowitt), and “listening habitus” (Lisbeth Lipari), I revisit canonical documentary theorizations of voice to refocus their concerns with how documentaries speak or “give voice” to how documentary practices and conventions condition hearing and shape listening habits. I map the documentary listening habitus in terms of two divergent habits of listening: objective listening and embodied listening. These listening habits are entangled with auditory discernments that extend beyond documentary, including accent neutralization in the call center industry, audism or the pathologization of hearing impairments, and forensic listening in asylum cases. At stake in this shift is an apprehension of how documentary listeners are powerfully implicated in the distribution of political, social, and material resources.

Keywords: [documentary](#), [voice](#), [listening](#), [sound](#), [auditory discrimination](#)

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THIS chapter stages a conversation between documentary studies and auditory cultural studies, narrowing in on a term that has been a central if elusive force in shaping the field of documentary: “voice.” I argue that documentary emerges from a powerful metaphysical tradition from which we have inherited our assumptions about voice, including its associations with agency, presence, and rationality—and the conviction that the embodied, material aspects of voice are disruptive to the agency of the speaking subject. The chapter poses the following questions: if “voice” signals or indexes the human, then how do the documentary conventions of “having a voice” distribute and calibrate what counts as human in the sonic domain? How do documentary practices of representing the spoken word respond to and shape conditions of audibility that not only premeditate acts of voicing, but also shape forms of attention that evaluate and

hierarchize these acts? How, then, do these practices and conventions manufacture, codify, and regulate differences of race, gender, bodily ability, and other socially constructed sonic identities through the ear?

I answer these questions not through readings of specific films but by reading the history of documentary studies as a series of explicit and implicit attempts to theorize voice.¹ Recent research in the field of auditory cultural studies shifts our attention from questions of how documentary films speak—or to what they “give voice”—to how they shape the conditions of possibility of audibility. I draw on a number of terms to rethink documentary parlance, including the “listening ear” (Jennifer Lynn Stoeber), “audit” (John Mowitt), and “listening habitus” (Lisbeth Lipari).² Separately, and in conjunction, these terms raise methodological provocations regarding documentary as a site of auditory interpellation—an apparatus of audibility—that teaches us not only how to speak but how to listen and what to listen for.

p. 404 My main intervention is redefining the pervasive idea of the “voice of documentary” as an *audibility*, a term I develop by adapting Gilles Deleuze’s concept of “visibilities.”³ The concept of “documentary audibilities” foregrounds how documentary’s vocal conventions are implicated in the work of shaping forms of attention that have the capacity both to reinforce and to undermine a logocentric view of the world. I wish to grasp how documentary is involved in the training and humanization of the ear, producing a “documentary listening habitus” that inhabits us as audiences, and that we, in turn, embody, perform, and inflect when we recognize the audible evidence of difference. I frame the documentary listening habitus in terms of two divergent or polar habits of listening: objective listening and embodied listening. These listening habits are entangled with discriminatory auditory practices that extend beyond documentary, including accent neutralization in the call center industry, audism or the pathologization of hearing impairments, and forensic listening in asylum cases. The concept of a documentary listening habitus enables us to reckon with the far-reaching implications of documentary audibilities with an eye—or ear—to our auditory futures.

The Voice of Documentary

Voice is an elusive but pervasive signifier in documentary studies. Thanks to an early and influential essay by Bill Nichols, “voice,” rather than “gaze,” has become the prevailing metaphor for a documentary film’s unique worldview or social perspective. Nichols defines the “voice of documentary” as “something narrower than style: that which conveys to us a sense of a text’s social point of view, of how it is speaking to us and how it is organizing the materials it is presenting to us.”⁴ But even as he associates voice with speech, Nichols hastens to add: “‘voice’ is not restricted to any one code or feature such as dialogue or spoken commentary. Voice is perhaps akin to that intangible, *moiré*-like pattern formed by the unique interaction of all a film’s codes, and it applies to all modes of documentary.”⁵

Over the last three decades, scholars writing about wide-ranging documentary conventions (classical vocal narration, interviews) and approaches (wordless essay films, direct cinema) have adopted the “voice” metaphor, while practitioners have engaged it to theorize their own authorial address.⁶ Several of these scholars have commented on the complex formal, ethical, and political concerns condensed into this slippery signifier, pointing out that voice functions as a metaphor for the stylistic expressivity of a documentary film even as it invokes the documentary ethic of representing actual speaking subjects.⁷ Indeed, Nichols conflates the two, stating that voice is “like style, but with an added sense of ethical and political accountability.”⁸ However, few have probed the implications of this slippage, or troubled Nichols’s conviction that evolutions in documentary style that emphasize the self-conscious inclusion of multiple voices (especially those of the “voiceless”) resolve the ethical burden of representation. I turn now to some of the foundational theorizations of voice in documentary, including Nichols’s varied uses of this term. My survey of this terrain differs somewhat from those of my predecessors in that I foreground approaches that challenge the fundamental humanism of the voice narrative. The evolution of the documentary genre

toward ever-more inclusive forms, I argue, does not resolve the fundamental dilemma of what happens to the materiality of speaking voices in the process of being transformed into a signifying voice.

Nichols uses voice as a metaphor for the evolving stylistic modes of documentary: the expository, poetic, observational, participatory, reflexive, and performative modes.⁹ Nichols differentiates these modes by stylistic features (expository implies voice-over; observational implies no commentary; participatory implies interviews) that vary in terms of the number (single vs. multiple), address (direct vs. indirect), presence (embodied vs. disembodied), tone (didactic vs. self-questioning, explicit vs. implied), and social position (powerful vs. powerless) of actual speaking voices.¹⁰ Importantly, he traces a roughly chronological evolution from the un-self-consciously univocal (films featuring expository “voice of God” narration) to the self-consciously polyvocal (self-reflexive films that mix observation with interviews, and voice-over with intertitles, foregrounding their own mediation), arguing that each stylistic mode contests the ideological limitations of the prior mode.¹¹

Carl Plantinga has elaborated on the literary genealogy of Nichols’s voice metaphor and also contributed greatly to its extension. He likens Nichols’s account of the modes of documentary to the narratological theories of film and literary critics like David Bordwell and Seymour Chatman.¹² Nichols’s proximity to this lineage becomes especially pronounced in his later work, *Representing Reality*, where he shifts from the vocabulary of “voice” to “argument,” writing that every documentary film expresses an argument that represents an ideology and a rhetorical proposition about how the world is.¹³ “Voice,” as Plantinga notes, is more capacious and non-evaluative than “argument.” It accommodates those poetic, world-making dimensions of documentary that exceed rhetorical argumentation.¹⁴ In apprehending voice as the discursive materialization of the film’s ideological comportment, overt or covert, toward what is represented, Plantinga sees voice first and foremost in terms of narrational authority.¹⁵ Unlike Nichols, Plantinga therefore distinguishes between modes of documentary based not on formal or stylistic features but rather on the degree of narrational authority assumed by the film.¹⁶

Plantinga thus usefully decouples the relational ethics of documentary from particular stylistic conventions, allowing us to apprehend that the self-conscious inclusion of marginalized voices does not necessarily resolve the burden of representation. Despite Trinh T. Minh-ha’s extensive writings to the effect, this remains an unpopular opinion in documentary studies, perhaps owing to the long shadow cast by Nichols. Sarah Kessler has recently attempted to remedy this consensus by pointing out the unexpected affinities among Trinh and Nichols in their writings on ethnographic and interview-based films that feature social actors speaking in their own voices as opposed to being spoken about or observed. Kessler excellently synthesizes these concerns using the framework of ventriloquism. Documentary film, she writes, can be understood as ↪ a ventriloquial operation in which claims to objectivity mask the film’s distortion of voices that it claims to allow to “speak for themselves.”¹⁷ Whereas Trinh argues that the vocal alterity of indigenous people enlisted to speak about their lives is subordinated to scientific-humanistic commentary, Nichols argues that filmmakers subordinate their own voice and perspective to those of interview subjects whose discursive immediacy they exploit.¹⁸ Historically disenfranchised or “voiceless” subjects thus frequently become puppets or mouthpieces for the filmmaker, even as they appear to speak for themselves. To be given voice, Kessler concludes, is therefore to be objectified or evacuated of the very voice that transforms an object into a speaking subject.¹⁹

The framework of ventriloquism is edifying because it upends the humanist narrative of inclusion that dominates discussions of voice in documentary studies (voicing turns objects into speaking subjects). Nichols remains committed to this narrative in his recent book *Speaking Truths with Film*, where he has revisited the voice metaphor. Here, he frames voice as a humanizing process of becoming a speaking subject in conversation with listening subjects who confirm and ratify the significance of those speech acts. He argues that documentary’s interpellative address—its voice—distinguishes it from the overseen and overheard world of fiction, and plays a key role in constituting a shared world between speakers and

listeners: “Unexpectedly, someone calls out: ‘Hey, you!’ [...] to be addressed by a film—to sense that a film seeks to engage and speak to us about the world we share—functions as a hallmark of documentary film.”²⁰

This is another version of what Nichols has argued in his earlier writings: despite differences in who speaks and how, and whether the film’s message is conveyed through explicit or implicit means, all documentary films share the common denominator of a distinctive *voice*. As Nichols now puts it, what arrests our attention in documentary, what makes us turn around and *listen* in response to its “Hey, you!,” is the implied presence of verbal address, the *sense* of a voice speaking to us, even when we don’t hear words. Following the antihumanist line of thinking that I have traced, we can restate this as follows: the interpellative force of embodied utterances makes a textual documentary voice palpable and sensible even as these utterances sacrifice their materiality for audibility. Or, documentary voicing involves transforming embodied utterances into a form that can be perceived, recognized, or *sensed* as a voice. The metaphorical use of voice to refer to that intangible but palpable *something*—that *sense* of a shared world—obscures the fundamental question: who or what disappears when we hear the voice of documentary?

Disappearing Matter

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When it is posed in this way, the elusive place of voice in documentary resonates with what scholars of auditory culture have argued is the fate of voice in the Western metaphysical tradition, which is to disappear, or to lose its materiality. Voice, Mladen Dolar writes, is often regarded as “the material support of bringing about meaning, yet it does not contribute to it itself ... It [this material support] makes the utterance possible, but it disappears in it, it goes up in smoke in the meaning being produced.”²¹ But not all voices disappear equally. The Western metaphysical and linguistic traditions have bequeathed us the ideas of voice as a guarantor of truth and self-presence (hence the association of voicing with selfhood, subjectivity, and agency), as well as the idea that the sonic, material aspects of voice are secondary and disruptive to the sovereignty of the subject.²² Voice, in metaphysical thinking, is conflated with a signifying, authorial voice, and in linguistics with spoken words and their rhetorical arrangement. In contrast, the embodied, paralinguistic dimensions of voice (accents, intonation, timbre, affectations, vocal fry) and prelinguistic, postlinguistic, or aphonic utterances (like sighs, muttering, echolalia, babbling, humming, laughter, or stammers) are potential obstacles to “proper” voicing—*unless* they are coded as nonmatter, that is, as a neutral, seemingly immaterial norm.²³ To hear a voice or respond to its hail (“Hey, you!”) is to participate in this metaphysics by distinguishing between mere sound and a “significant sound” produced by a human soul—which is Aristotle’s definition of voice.²⁴

The binary between a signifying voice and a vocality outside of referential meaning has been elaborated in terms of various dividing lines: that between human and animal, language and music, male and female, able-bodied and disabled, white and Black, or neutral and “accented” voices. Notably, in each of these instances, the second term in the binary is framed as an “excessive but powerless” form of sonority that has to be made sense of—*made audible*—by the authorial voice represented by the first term in the binary, which represents the standard in relation to which the second term is measured and judged.²⁵ This normalizing dynamic can be traced across a range of geopolitical sites. For instance, female politicians and public figures (Margaret Thatcher is a famous example) are routinely trained to lower their vocal pitch in order to sound more authoritative and emotionally “neutral,” whereas men who talk in a higher pitch risk being mocked as “effeminate, camp, or gay.”²⁶ A “neutral accent” is also the goal of accent neutralization programs in offshore call centers that train migrants from smaller Indian towns to sound worldlier to minimize aural and cultural dissonance for native-English-speaking customers in the United States, UK, Canada, or Australia.²⁷

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The vocal distinctions that inform these practices are gendered, classed, and ethnicized variants of what Jennifer Lynn Stoever calls the “sonic color line”: “a socially constructed boundary that racially codes sonic phenomena such as vocal timbre, accents, and musical tone.”²⁸ The sonic color line “produces, codes, and polices racial difference through the ear” and “enables listeners to construct and discern racial identities based on voices, sounds, and particular soundscapes.”²⁹ Stoever introduces the term “the listening ear” for the ideological filter shaped in relation to the sonic color line. The listening ear is shaped by an aggregate of normative listening practices that channel the polymodal diversity of embodied listening practices into a narrow corridor of “correct” or “reasonable” responses. An example might be the way that popular Black musical genres like hip-hop become essentialized and racialized bearers of connotations such as crime or noise pollution, or, to cite a different historical aspect of Stoever’s research, the way the singing styles of white female American opera singers in the nineteenth century were believed to embody an idealized “feminine range,” while those of their Black female counterparts were associated with masculinity and hypersexuality.³⁰ Stoever additionally notes that the kinds of embodied listening practices filtered out by the listening ear include a wide spectrum of D/deaf listening practices.³¹

Effectively, the listening ear shapes an “order of sounds” and regimes of listening, training audiences to discern socially constructed hierarchies—of species, race, gender, class, bodily ability, and so on—through the ear, and normalizing auditory standards associated with able-bodied, white, Anglophone, elite, cisgender, heterosexual masculinity.³² John Mowitt has, building on a psychoanalytic theoretical lineage, developed a similar concept: audit. “Audit” is an analogue of “gaze” in the sonic domain that roughly designates “that which exceeds and conditions hearing and organizes the field of the audible.”³³ Mowitt describes audit as a “hearing,” or a mode of perception that has a primordial tie with aesthetics, or “the distribution of the sensible.”³⁴ Essentially, what Mowitt means by this is that (a) aesthetic forms introduce thoroughly ideological, if unconscious, perceptual distinctions, hierarchies, or distributions into the conceptual domain of sound; and (b) these aesthetic forms, and the perceptual attunements that they cultivate in their audience, are both produced by and productive of the discursive conditions of audibility in any given conjuncture.

Documentary is an aesthetic form that is both produced by and actively productive of the audit. Scholars like Stoever and Mowitt demonstrate how metaphysical and metaphorical ideas about voice emerge from the aesthetic practices—including documentary practices and conventions—through which sonorous material is made audible *as voice*.³⁵ Their contributions to auditory cultural studies emphasize the co-constitution of bodies and culture, listening practices, and auditory regimes.³⁶ If we take these insights seriously, we cannot continue to describe “the voice of documentary” as a passive description of a film’s textual point of view, or as a representation of a person or referent out there in the world. The voice of documentary is an *audibility*.³⁷

From Voice to Audibility

By positioning the voice of documentary as an audibility, I am drawing not only on Stoever’s “listening ear” and Mowitt’s “audit” but also Gilles Deleuze’s concept of “visibility.” Deleuze uses the term “visibility” to highlight a conceptual maneuver in Michel Foucault’s readings of the modernization of institutions of confinement like the asylum and the prison in the eighteenth century.³⁸ Deleuze notes that, per Foucault’s analysis, these modern institutions functioned as discursive as well as architectural forms that introduced new ways of seeing, displaying, and speaking about madness and crime: namely, as visible enclosures that framed those inside as confined (and thus, “deviant”) and those outside as free (and thus, “normal”).

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Instead of treating the “facts” of confinement and freedom (or deviation and norm) made visible by these institutions as self-evidences, Foucault focuses on them as *products of discursive illumination*, that is, as

the product rather than the referent of a visual apparatus. For Deleuze, Foucault demonstrates a novel way of thinking about visibility that refuses naïve empiricism. Foucault shows that the very form of visibility made possible by these institutions keeps us from understanding how it is the purported “outside”—those that are ostensibly free—who are actually confined, through a process of epistemological refinement that excludes criminality and illness from the domain of humanity, locates these qualities in particular “deviant” bodies, and sets those bodies apart in an environment of apparent enclosure. Accordingly, Deleuze proposes that visible facts, or what he calls “visibilities,” are not preexisting forms, qualities, or characteristics of an object that would show up under light. Instead, visibilities are “forms of luminosity which are created by the light itself and allow a thing or object to exist only as a flash, sparkle or shimmer.”³⁹ In other words, Deleuze is saying that facts become visible in their particular and recognizable form only as a result of the discursive a priori that structure our modes of visual attention and recognition; in this instance, those discursive a priori represent an entangled and enmeshed social field as an illusory architecture of norms and deviations.

Transposing the notion of visibilities to the auditory plane offers a useful way of approaching “voice” as the product of refinements of sound and listening that precede and include documentary. Voice is not a preexisting form, quality, or characteristic of a subject that is out there waiting to be heard. Voice is the product of sonic forms, linguistic traditions, and auditory practices that render sounds and gestures socially meaningful or disposable and call into being practices of listening that resonate with those meanings. Both within and beyond the field of documentary, “having a voice” tends to be understood as a sign of inclusion, a marker of humanity, and thus of membership in a “shared world,” to borrow Nichols’s phrase. But if we follow the Foucauldian logic, via Deleuze, these processes of shaping sound as voice—of making audible—can be understood as a process not of inclusion but of discursive exclusion, confinement, and discrimination. These processes of shaping sound as voice precede documentary, but as an audiovisual genre whose modes of interpellation lean toward the audial as much as if not more so than the visual, documentary also participates in these processes of auditory discrimination and discernment.

This line of thinking demands a new definition of the “voice of documentary.” To recap, this phrase has been defined by Nichols as “that which conveys to us a sense of a text’s social point of view, of how it is speaking to us, and how it is organizing the materials it is presenting to us.”⁴⁰ Nichols has also written that “to be addressed by a film—to sense that a film seeks to engage and speak to us about the world we share—functions as a hallmark of documentary film.”⁴¹ I propose a new definition: the voice of documentary is a specific *form of audibility* whose rhetorical and aesthetic modes of sonic focus (a) fashion its contents in forms that can be understood and apprehended as a voice, (b) shape a listening ear that accommodates its call, and (c) materialize a mode of relation or resonance—a “shared world”—between these felt but often unspoken forms of speaking and listening. To understand what is at stake in this mode of relation between the film’s speech and the form of listening that it cultivates, we must attend not only to the metaphysical inheritance of “having a voice” and “lending a (listening) ear” but also to the discursive and architectural enclosures that have historically framed embodied modes of voicing and listening, and in which documentary films participate and intervene when they “seek to engage and speak to us about the world we share.”

The Documentary Listening Habitus

Approaching voice as an audibility offers new insights into documentary's emphasis on vocal conventions such as voice-over, interview, conversation, and testimony. It also shifts and adds specificity to the ground from which we pose questions about these cinematic conventions and their ethical implications. In place of (or in addition to) the question "who is speaking for whom, how, and why?," we can now ask: How do documentary's vocal conventions make embodied utterances audible, and with what effects? How do these documentary audibilities reproduce—or conversely, deconstruct—the entrenched socially constructed binaries of signifying voices and vocalities outside referential meaning? What forms of listening do these audibilities model, sanction, elevate, and endow with value, and what forms of listening do they diminish, mark as deviant, or render inadmissible?

The audibilities frame brings into focus what I see as a central tension within as well as the potential of documentary: that between the ontological diversity of sound opened up by the documentary encounter, and the lingering imperative of objectivity that filters, adjusts, hierarchizes, and *humanizes* this diversity as voice. As Michel Chion reminds us, sound in cinema, unlike the image, has no frame or "auditory container" to stop it from penetrating and enveloping the listening subject.⁴² Sound and listening do not by themselves constitute an alternative metaphysics—indeed, sound can be just as effective as a medium of segregation as vision—but they nonetheless provide an opening onto a mode of relating to the world founded on the possibility of leakage and permeability, in which the listener and the perceived are "intersubjectively constituted in perception."⁴³ Documentary's world-building capacities benefit from being thought through in these terms. What auditory relations do documentary forms cultivate when they expose audiences to unsettling sonic worlds, and alternately, when they organize, hierarchize, and domesticate these worlds as voice?

p. 411 I would like to propose that these two tendencies correspond to listening habits that represent divergent poles of the *documentary listening habitus*. Lisbeth Lipari develops the term "listening habitus" as an extension of Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, which describes "the constellation of deeply embedded and experientially shaped patterns of thoughts, attitudes, practices, tastes, preferences and so forth that each person acquires as a result of socialization."⁴⁴ Building on this concept, Lipari proposes that "we each develop ways of listening (or not) that are partly shaped by culture and our social location within it, and partly by our personalities and particular life experiences. This is what we might call our listening habitus, which is based on a combination of ↵ cultural, social, and personal experiences."⁴⁵ Documentary audibilities similarly cultivate distinct listening habits in audiences (habits we inhabit and which inhabit us) at the same time as documentary forms begin to embody and emulate these listening habits. I want to concentrate on two habits of listening: objective listening and embodied listening. Contrary to popular beliefs regarding listening as a deliberate channeling of attention, these practices of documentary listening may largely be unconscious and automatic precisely because they are habitual.⁴⁶ Objective and embodied listening are not mutually exclusive or exclusive of other modes of listening. Rather, we can regard them as opposing tendencies whose combinations and mutations comprise a significant spectrum of the documentary listening habitus.

Objective listening regards the listening subject as a disembodied scientific instrument that can register the sounds of the world "objectively" rather than as a situated, embodied presence that is shaped by and shaping of those sonic events. Its persistence as a documentary attitude demonstrates the continuing influence of objectivity, a nineteenth-century scientific attitude that aspires to "neutral" knowledge that "bears no trace of the knower."⁴⁷ Objective listening extracts sounds (including vocal soundings) from the world in which they participate and regards them as something dissectable, physical, and object-like. In its emphasis on accuracy, efficiency, and denotation, objective listening shares some common features with the "transmission" and "semiotic" models of communication.⁴⁸ Forensic listening is an example of

objective listening in action. Currently employed in the information technology security industry as well as in border control, this radicalized form of legal listening frequently results in wrongful deportations based on vocal discrimination. Forensic phoneticians who employ accent analysis to determine asylum entitlement (a practice employed across Western Europe and Australia) regard the accents of asylum seekers like a birth certificate or passport indicating geographic origin, disregarding the fact that the instability of an accent bears witness to the migratory lifestyle common to those seeking asylum and that every act of voicing is calibrated (or accentuated) to resonate with its intended listener.⁴⁹

Objective listening thus disavows an apprehension of communication as both constituted by and constitutive of the material and discursive world. In other words, it disavows how individuals' listening practices are *embodied*, shaped by "the totality of their experiences, historical context, and physicality, as well as intersecting subject positions and particular interactions with power."⁵⁰ Similar to the "constitutive" view of communication, embodied listening is attentive to how the material and ideological positioning of the listener is shaped in conjunction with the act of listening.⁵¹ It is reflective of an attitude that recognizes that the reduction of sound to a listening subject is as illusory as the objective pursuit of sound without a listener.⁵² Haptic listening is an example of embodied listening. Film scholar Irina Leimbacher uses this term to refer to a radically ethical mode of listening that receives sonorous alterity without seeking to understand or master it.⁵³ Leimbacher differentiates haptic listening from verbal- or referent-oriented listening. Whereas the latter privileges "gleaning signification and knowledge from words," the former prioritizes an embodied attention to "a voice's textural and emotional qualities."⁵⁴

p. 412 Haptic listening thus "shifts our ethical relation with the recorded subject, experienced not merely as a dispenser of information or opinion but also as a sonorous being whose voice resounds in us."⁵⁵

Evidence, information, and facts were the *historical* purview of documentary film—or so we are told. Documentary in the classical Griersonian tradition aimed to "persuade viewers to invest belief, to produce 'visible evidence,' and even induce social action."⁵⁶ The vocal convention most commonly associated with this tradition—didactic expository commentary, delivered in the third person from offscreen, mockingly called the "Voice of God"—reflected a keenly historical understanding of how the metaphysical attunement to an idealized speaking voice as a bearer of reason could be combined with the detached metaposition of seeing from above to produce the impression of objectivity and unproblematic truth.⁵⁷ The implied objectivity of classical vocal commentary has since been exposed as a "mask" or "hysterical barrier" designed to contain the multiple, uncertain, and debatable meanings of recorded sounds and images.⁵⁸ Much of the scholarship on trends in documentary film narrates the history of the genre as an ongoing attempt to breach this barrier and liberate these meanings, reflecting the continued influence of Nichols's account of the documentary genre's progressive evolution from univocal to polyvocal styles.⁵⁹

Voice of God commentary keeps at bay the impermanence, instability, and unboundedness implied by the phenomenality of sound and asserts a visualist, object-centered philosophy bent on measurement, certainty, and control—in short, a philosophy that aligns with and invites objective listening.⁶⁰ However, the propensity for objective listening persists in the observational and participatory modes of documentary, despite their reputation for exposing audiences to a comparatively greater tonal and timbral range of vocal soundings. Documentary historians heralded the emergence of direct cinema and *cinéma vérité* in the 1960s (made possible by the availability and accessibility of new sync-sound technologies) as a beacon of documentary's pleasure and promise: sonic fidelity. Indeed, documentary sounds shot on location often lack vocal clarity, and ambient sounds tend to compete with dialogue, resulting in a blurring of human, mechanical, nonhuman, and unidentifiable sounds. Additionally, as Jeffrey Ruoff asserts, "[c]haracters in documentary films typically demonstrate a wider variety of accents, dialects, and speech patterns than those found in fiction films ... Part of the delight comes from hearing the material texture and richness of unrehearsed speech, the grain of the voice."⁶¹

Ruoff's comments bring to mind a film such as *Deaf* (Frederick Wiseman, 1986), which was shot at the School for the Deaf at the Alabama Institute, and which features numerous lengthy sequences of students, parents, and teachers communicating using sign language, lip reading, and nonverbal gestures, as well as speech. The film is notable for Wiseman's decision not to caption or subtitle these sequences but to dwell in their duration—a choice that requires audiences to inhabit the disorienting experience of learning D/deaf communication. But this film is an outlier. Documentaries conventionally seek to orient rather than to disorient their audiences.⁶² Vocal inflections, colloquialisms, timbre, and accent—which can chart desire and (un)belonging across differences of class, ethnicity, geography, gender, ability, and sexuality, and trigger ↵ affective relationships across these lines—also present challenges for the audience's understanding. While the chaos of sound recorded on location testifies to the immediacy and authenticity of documentary, it is also at risk of becoming dislocated from visual points of reference, moving instead into the “non-referential realm of music.”⁶³

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Measures such as subtitling, dubbing, miking interviews using directional microphones, synchronizing voices to bodies, and editing out silences and phatic cues neutralize and contain sonic events that threaten to escape the referential act. These conventions are the seam between expository and *vérité*-style realism: both hold up a fantasmatic image of voice–body unity that reassures the listener of their place in the ontological order of things.⁶⁴ These conventional mechanisms accomplish a variety of compensatory effects: they habituate documentary audiences to vococentrism, or an attunement to (an idealized) voice as the apex of a soundscape; rehome errant voices in bodies; lasso the ear to the gaze; and subordinate sonic disturbance to verbal information, which functions thereafter as evidence of a speaking and thinking being.⁶⁵ As a case in point, we might consider the use of subtitles to help viewers to comprehend the regional accents of Black subjects from the Mississippi Delta in a film such as *LaLee's Kin* (Albert Maysles, Deborah Dickson, and Susan Froemke, 2001). In one sense these subtitles are perfectly ordinary and unremarkable conventions, but their conventionality also has the effect of standardizing the accented basis of some voices and accentuating or marking the “otherness” of others, thus enabling an unspoken yet palpable norm to emerge: a “neutral” textual voice, and its counterpart, a “neutral” listening ear.⁶⁶ “Language as voice and music—grain, tone, inflections, pauses, silences, repetitions—goes underground,” as Trinh puts it.⁶⁷

We can thus grasp the form of audibility or voice “given” by these vococentric documentary conventions as a container or trap that limits the expressive range of vocalization and the world that such voicing can summon into being. When the embodied materiality or *sound* of voices disappears in documentary's audiovisual hierarchy, the embodied range of the documentary listening habitus is also confined and set apart, relegated to a type of sonic penumbra. Without being overly conclusive or prescriptive, I will end by gesturing toward recent attempts to evolve an audiovisual and critical vocabulary around films that invite their listeners to reckon with this sonic penumbra.⁶⁸ Leimbacher has written on films that magnify the tonal, timbral, and rhythmic qualities of the “sonorous voice” as a testimonial presence. For instance, *Bocas de Ceniza* (“Mouths of Ash,” Juan Manuel Echavarría, 2003–2004) employs “singing head” testimonies by victims and witnesses of political violence in Colombia whose searing and trembling vocal textures entreat listeners to attend to the “flow and process of the ‘saying’ rather than focusing solely on the ‘said of speech.’”⁶⁹ Leimbacher, Kessler, Patrik Sjöberg and I have all written, in different contexts, about films that encourage us to listen “ventriloquially” to the mismatch between voices, the bodies from which they emerge, and the vocalic bodies that they summon into being. Some of these films, like *Kurz Davor Ist Es Passiert* (“It Happened Just Before,” Anja Salomonowitz, 2007), *Covers* (Adie Russell, 2006–present) and *Paris Without a Sea* (Mounira Al Solh, 2007–2008) employ the Brechtian strategy of attaching voices to bodies to which they don't ↵ “belong.”⁷⁰ Mockumentaries like *Waiting for Guffman* (Christopher Guest, 1997) feature a voice—in this case a “gay” voice—whose audible materiality “tells on” its linguistic content, calling attention to the ventriloquial basis of voices as well as the gendered and sexualized expectations that shape assumptions regarding the unity of testimonial voices and bodies.⁷¹

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I have argued in this chapter that documentary films emerge from and shape forms of audibility that teach us how to listen and what to listen for. I have also argued that far from being a neutral activity, listening is both thoroughly political and habitual. In listening to documentary, we participate in social processes that produce the very meaning and domain of “voice”—processes that have historically excluded and marked embodied speaking and listening practices as deviant. Documentary forms have participated in and extended these dynamics, but they also have the capacity to function as a training ground for embodied modes of listening. But because of the long shadow cast by metaphysical and metaphorical ideas about voice and listening, the embodied voice and ear often abide in penumbral conditions that detract from their materiality and embodiment and invite an objective, disembodied attention to their “message.” Contending with these penumbral audibilities requires new audiovisual and critical vocabularies. It is with this goal in mind that I propose moving away from the vocabulary of the “voice of documentary” to that of documentary audibilities and listening habits.

Notes

1. For readers interested in the textual applications of the concepts I introduce, I include references to other essays and articles in which I focus on readings of specific films.
2. Jennifer Lynn Stoeber, *The Sonic Color Line: Race and the Cultural Politics of Listening* (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 13; John Mowitt, *Sounds: The Ambient Humanities* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 5–6; Lisbeth Lipari, *Listening, Thinking, Being: Toward an Ethics of Attunement* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014), 52.
3. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 52.
4. Bill Nichols, “The Voice of Documentary,” *Film Quarterly* 36, no. 6 (1983): 18.
5. *Ibid.*, 18.
6. See, for instance, Charles Wolfe, “Historicizing the ‘Voice of God’: The Place of Vocal Narration in Classical Documentary,” *Film History* 9, no. 2 (1997): 150; Leger Grindon, “Q & A: Poetics of the Documentary Film Interview,” *The Velvet Light Trap* 60 (2007): 8 (see the section “Analytic Categories”); David Oscar Harvey, “The Limits of Vococentrism: Chris Marker, Hans Richter, and the Essay Film,” *SubStance* 41, no. 2 (2012): 8–9; Marit Corneil, “Seizing Novels from Life: Oral/Aural Self-Mythologizing in *Pour la Suite du Monde*,” in *Beyond the Visual: Sound and Image in Ethnographic and Documentary Film*, ed. Gunnar Iversen and Jan Ketil Simonsen (Højbjerg, Denmark: Intervention Press, 2010), 108–12; Trish FitzSimons, “Braided Channels: A Genealogy of the Voice of Documentary,” *Studies in Documentary Film* 3, no. 2 (2009): 132.
7. Voice in Nichols’s sense is “nonvococentric,” as Harvey notes, representing a generalized rather than a narrowly vocal expressive subjectivity. Harvey, “The Limits of Vococentrism,” 8. On one hand, Wolfe notes, “voice provides a master trope for theorizing the founding principles of documentary narration and rhetoric, governing the formal construction of a work of non-fiction across different stylistic registers. Wolfe, “Historicizing the ‘Voice of God,’” 150. Simultaneously, voice invokes the varied narrative possibilities and political stakes of representing actual speaking subjects—an invocation that is suggestive, to quote Corneil, of a “certain ‘agency.’” Corneil, “Seizing Novels from Life,” 109, also see 112.
8. See Bill Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 71. Nichols elaborates: “voice serves to give concrete embodiment to a filmmaker’s engagement with the world. The voice of documentary testifies to the character of the filmmaker ... to how he acquits himself in the face of social reality, as much as to his creative vision. Style takes on an ethical dimension” (71).
9. See Nichols, “The Voice of Documentary,” 17–18; Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary*, 67–93. The poetic and performative modes are new additions included in the textbook but not the 1983 article.
10. See Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary*, 142–211.
11. Nichols, “The Voice of Documentary,” 18; Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary*, 67–93. Although Nichols notes that each

mode contests the ideological limitations of the prior mode, he also treats each mode as an expansive container for films that are un-self-conscious about the reality-effects of their formal devices, as well as those that self-consciously experiment with, or draw attention to, the ideological and ethical implications of the same. As a case in point, Nichols includes within the participatory mode (interview-based films) realist films such as *The Woman's Film* (San Francisco Newsreel, 1971) as well as those that are essayistic, such as *Tarnation* (Jonathan Caouette, 2003) and *vérité*-based, such as *Chronicle of a Summer* (Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin, 1961). See Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary*, 151, 181–82.

12. Carl R. Plantinga, *Rhetoric and Representation in Nonfiction Film* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 99; also see Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 153. Chatman describes point of view as an ideological orientation and voice as the overt means through which that orientation is communicated.
 13. With this shift, Nichols emphasizes those rhetorical dimensions of the documentary genre that rely on an informing logic borne forth by words, whether explicitly, through verbal commentary, or implicitly, through the evidentiary arrangement of images and sounds. If the film proposes “This is so, isn’t it?” then “[t]he work of rhetoric is to move us to answer ‘Yes, it’s so,’ tacitly—whereby a set of assumptions and an image of the world implant themselves, available for our use as orientation and guide in the future—or overtly—whereby our own conscious beliefs and purposes align themselves with those proposed for us.” See Bill Nichols, *Representing Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 140.
 14. As Michael Renov has pointed out, the poetic functions of documentary go beyond persuasion and promotion, and analysis and interrogation (the argumentative tendencies Nichols stresses) and include recording, revealing, preserving (elemental functions that can be traced back to the earliest *actualités*), and expressing (which can be imagistic and sensorial, not merely verbal, as in the case of experimental documentary films from 1920s city symphonies to contemporary sensory ethnographies). See Michael Renov, “Toward a Poetics of Documentary,” in *Theorizing Documentary*, ed. Michael Renov (New York: Routledge, 1993), 21; also see 25–28 and 32–35.
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15. Corneil argues that for Nichols, voice is “*style plus*,” whereas Plantinga understands voice in documentary as “*point of view plus*.” Plantinga defines voice as nonfiction film’s way of taking a point of view by selecting, ordering, and emphasizing audiovisual material: voice for him encompasses the point of view of the camera, filmmaker, or characters, as well as other rhetorical gestures and genre norms. See Corneil, “Seizing Novels from Life,” 112; also see Plantinga, *Rhetoric and Representation in Nonfiction Film*, 86.
 16. Plantinga’s “formal voice” includes films that tend to close down interpretive possibilities whether through expository narration, such as *The Times of Harvey Milk* (Rob Epstein, 1984), or through the argumentative editing of interviews, such as *Roger and Me* (Michael Moore, 1989). In contrast, the “open voice,” under which Plantinga files direct cinema, as well as autobiographical films like those of Ross McElwee, affords audiences more interpretive space. See Plantinga, *Rhetoric and Representation in Nonfiction Film*, 108–15.
 17. Sarah Kessler, “Puppet Love: Documenting Ventriloquism in Nina Conti’s *Her Master’s Voice*,” *Camera Obscura* 31, no. 2 (2016): 65.
 18. See Trinh T. Minh-ha, *When the Moon Waxes Red* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 91; Nichols, “The Voice of Documentary,” 24.
 19. Kessler, “Puppet Love,” 69. For Kessler this is also evidence of the proximity of documentary to fiction film, whose practices of synchronization and dubbing have been described by feminist film critics like Mary Ann Doane and Kaja Silverman as gendered special effects rather than a record of reality—effects by which voices are artificially tethered to bodies on-screen and off. See Kessler, “Puppet Love,” 66; also see Mary Ann Doane, “The Voice in Cinema: The Articulation of Body and Space,” *Yale French Studies* (Cinema/Sound) (1980), Article 60; Kaja Silverman, *The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
 20. Bill Nichols, *Speaking Truths with Film: Evidence, Ethics, Politics in Documentary* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 74.
 21. See Mladen Dolar, *A Voice and Nothing More* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 15.
 22. See Amanda Weidman, “Voice,” in *Keywords in Sound*, ed. David Novak and Matt Sakakeeny (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 234.

23. See Dolar, *Voice and Nothing More*, 20; Weidman, "Voice," 233.
 24. See Frances Dyson, *Sounding New Media: Immersion and Embodiment in the Arts and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 8. Dyson writes that voice is a metaphysical filter for transforming sound into speech and utterance into language.
 25. Weidman, "Voice," 234.
 26. See Anne Karpf, *The Human Voice: The Story of a Remarkable Talent* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 226–29; 180.
 27. In his 2015 ethnography of call centers in Gurgaon, India, A. Aneesh explains how middle- and lower-middle class migrants from smaller Indian towns are trained to perform a globalized class identity by adopting Anglicized pseudonyms, "switching off" local and regional linguistic habits, and imitating common features of English speech that persist, to degrees, in the dominant accents associated with the four aforementioned locations. See A. Aneesh, *Neutral Accent: How Language, Labor, and Life Became Global* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 6–8; 62.
 28. Jennifer Lynn Stoeber, *The Sonic Color Line: Race and the Cultural Politics of Listening* (New York: New York University Press, 2016), 10; 11.
 29. *Ibid.*, 11.
 30. *Ibid.*, 13, 86.
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31. *Ibid.*, 15. These include sign language and "look-listening" (Cardinale: an interpretive mode that correlates visual sensations to speech and noises), "multimodal listening" (Ceraso: a synesthetic, full-bodied approach to interpreting vibratory sensations through the convergence of sight, sound, and touch), and "electrical hearing" (Mills, Chorost: the experience of hearing sounds imperfectly rendered through speech processors and cochlear implants). See Cara Lynne Cardinale, "'Through the Eyes': Reading Deafened Gestures of Look-Listening in Twentieth Century Narratives" (PhD diss., University of California, Riverside, 2010); Steph Ceraso, "(Re)Educating the Senses: Multimodal Listening, Bodily Learning, and the Composition of Sonic Experiences," *College English* 77, no. 2 (2014): 102–23, esp. 103–4; Mara Mills, "Deafness," in *Keywords in Sound*, ed. David Novak and Matt Sakakeeny (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 53; also see Michael Chorost, *Rebuilt: How Becoming Part Computer Made Me More Human* (New York: Houghton Mifflin), 2005.
 32. François Bonnet, *The Order of Sounds: A Sonorous Archipelago* (Falmouth, MA: Urbanomic Media, 2016).
 33. John Mowitt, *Sounds: The Ambient Humanities* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 5–6.
 34. *Ibid.*, 5; also see Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), 12.
 35. I owe this formulation to Weidman. See Weidman, "Voice," 236.
 36. As Brian Kane puts it, the study of auditory culture shows that "the capacities of the body are cultivated at the same time that cultures become embodied." See Brian Kane, "Sound Studies without Auditory Culture: A Critique of the Ontological Turn," *Sound Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 8.
 37. The discussion below expands on my introduction to a special issue of *Discourse* on documentary audibilities. See Pooja Rangan, "Audibilities: Voice and Listening in the Penumbra of Documentary: An Introduction," in "Documentary Audibilities," ed. Pooja Rangan and Genevieve Yue, special issue, *Discourse* 39, no. 3 (2017): 279–91.
 38. See Deleuze, *Foucault*, 47–79.
 39. *Ibid.*, 52.
 40. Nichols, "The Voice of Documentary," 18.
 41. Nichols, *Speaking Truths with Film*, 74.
 42. Michel Chion, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen*, trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 68.
 43. Salomé Voegelín, *Listening to Noise and Silence: Towards a Philosophy of Sound Art* (New York: Continuum, 2010), xii.

44. Lipari, *Listening, Thinking, Being*, 52.
45. Ibid., 52.
46. See Hillel Schwartz, "The Indefensible Ear: A History," in *The Auditory Culture Reader*, ed. Michael Bull and Les Back (New York: Berg, 2004), 488. I am building on Schwartz's research on the weakening distinction between hearing and listening, which have traditionally been framed as opposites.
47. See Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 2007), 17.
48. See Lipari, *Listening, Thinking, Being*, 10; 11. Summarizing a range of work in communication studies, Lipari writes that in the transmission paradigm, the "accuracy of the message, the efficiency of delivery, and the precision of reception are in the foreground while other much more interesting and important aspects of communication are missed" (10), whereas in the semiotic paradigm, signs are believed to have a one-to-one or denotative relationship with the world, rather than a relationship of slippage and connotative play (11).
49. See Lawrence Abu Hamdan, "Aural Contract: Forensic Listening and the Reorganization of the Listening Subject," *Cesura-Accesso* 1 (2014): <http://cesura-accesso.org/issues/aural-contract-forensic-listening-and-the-reorganization-of-the-speaking-subject-lawrence-abu-hamdan/>; Lawrence Abu Hamdan, "The Politics of Listening," Keynote Presentation: <http://lawrenceabuhamdan.com/#/talks/> (Accessed July 16, 2018). According to Hamdan, who has traced its emergence to legislative shifts in criminal law in the UK and many other European countries in the mid-1980s, forensic listening formalizes and amplifies an evidentiary regime of listening that was always present in the law: it regards the testimonial status of the voice as the objective truth of the witnessing body beyond the control of the speaking subject, rather than as something messy, subjective, interpersonal, mutable, relational, and context-specific.
50. Stoever, *Sonic Color Line*, 15. After writing this chapter, I discovered that D. Andy Rice uses the term "embodied listening" in an essay on the films of Irene Lusztig, referring to Lusztig's technique of filming the performed reading of archived letters. D. Andy Rice, "The Sense of Feminism Then and Now: *Yours in Sisterhood* (2018) and Embodied Listening in the Cinema Praxis of Irene Lusztig," *Senses of Cinema* 89 (December 2018): <http://sensesofcinema.com/2018/feature-articles/the-sense-of-feminism-then-and-now-yours-in-sisterhood-2018-and-embodied-listening-in-the-cinema-praxis-of-irene-lusztig/>. I hope to discuss the resonances of these ideas at greater length in another venue.
51. In the constitutive view of communication, "communication not only signifies or represents, but also constitutes 'world' between persons, creating correspondences not between language and a nonlinguistic world, but between speakers and listeners mutually co-constituted in a linguistic world." See Lipari, *Listening, Thinking, Being*, 11. Embodied listening, as I am defining it (building on Stoever), overlaps with but exceeds this view in that I am not confining communication to language.
52. By conceiving of listening in this way I do not mean to suggest that sounds are constructs that can be reduced to a listening subject. Rather, to borrow a phrase from James Steintrager and Rey Chow, I am acknowledging the "ineluctable noncoincidence of emission and reception and the entanglement of subjectivity and objectivity" involved in the perception of sound." See James A. Steintrager, with Rey Chow, "Sound Objects: An Introduction," in *Sound Objects*, ed. James A. Steintrager and Rey Chow (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 12.
53. Irina Leimbacher, "Hearing Voice(s): Experiments with Documentary Listening," *Discourse* 39, no. 3 (2017): 297.
54. Ibid., 298. Leimbacher evolves haptic listening as a close relative of "listening otherwise," Lipari's term for an expansive mode of listening that asks us to "simply stay with something," and to "just be with it, experience it, appreciate it, without having to fit it into some tidy box of 'understanding'" (297); also see Lipari, *Listening, Thinking, Being*, 136.
55. Leimbacher, "Hearing Voice(s)," 299.
56. Michael Renov, *The Subject of Documentary* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), xvii.
57. See Wolfe, "Historicizing the 'Voice of God,'" 149; Bruzzi, *New Documentary*, 48–49. The booming, stentorian "voice of God" commentary associated with *The March of Time* is often used as a derogatory stereotype for documentary narration writ large, even though, as Wolfe and Bruzzi have both noted, this variant was an outlier rather than a norm. As Bruzzi puts it, "the domination of the narration covertly serves to emphasize the incontrovertibility of the images by refusing to dispute and doubt what they depict." Bruzzi, *New Documentary*, 52.

58. Ibid., 59.
59. This includes analyses of the observational preference in the 1960s for a “minimum of commentary” in an effort to “let the event speak” (Bonitzer); the “polyvalence” of interview-based films that feature a range of dissenting opinions (Grindon); and the proliferation of videos in the 1990s featuring subjective vocal commentaries by women and other minoritized subjects that employ strategies such as irony, unreliability, contradiction, or digression (Armatage, Russell, Renov, Lebow). See Pascal Bonitzer, “The Silences of the Voice,” *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader*, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 320–22; Leger Grindon, “Q&A: The Poetics of the Documentary Film Interview,” *The Velvet Light Trap* 60 (2007): 8; Kay Armatage, “About to Speak: The Woman’s Voice in Patricia Gruben’s *Sifted Evidence*,” in *Take Two: A Tribute to Film in Canada*, ed. Seth Feldman (Toronto: Book Society of Canada, 1984), 298–303; Catherine Russell, *Experimental Ethnography: The Work of Film in the Age of Video* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 275–314; Renov, *Subject of Documentary*; Alisa Lebow, “Introduction,” in *The Cinema of Me: The Self and Subjectivity in First Person Documentary*, ed. Alisa Lebow, 1–11 (New York: Wallflower, 2012).
60. See Frances Dyson, “The Genealogy of the Radio Voice,” in *Radio/Rethink: Art, Sound, and Transmission*, ed. Daina Augaitis and Dan Lander (Alberta, Canada: Banff Center, 1994), 168–69.
61. See Jeffrey K. Ruoff, “Conventions of Sound in Documentary,” in *Sound Theory, Sound Practice*, ed. Rick Altman (New York: Routledge, 1992), 222–3. Ruoff contrasts the pleasures of sonic fidelity in documentary with the narrative pleasures of heightened vocal intelligibility, clarity, and comprehensibility in Hollywood-style fiction.
62. As Leimbacher notes, “[c]onventional nonfiction works tend to solicit an inquisitive and acquisitive listening that privileges the intake of coherent, concise verbal information.” See Leimbacher, “Hearing Voice(s),” 293.
63. Holly Rogers, “Introduction: Music, Sound and the Nonfiction Aesthetic,” in *Music and Sound in Documentary Film*, ed. Holly Rogers (New York: Routledge, 2015), 9.
64. See Ilona Hongisto, *Soul of the Documentary* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 86–88.
65. See Chion, *Voice in Cinema*, 5.
66. I have written elsewhere about the abbreviation of facilitated communication and the neutralization of accented speech in documentary representations of autistic protagonists and call center workers. See Pooja Rangan, “‘Having a Voice’: Toward an Autistic Counterdiscourse of Documentary,” in *Immediations: The Humanitarian Impulse in Documentary* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), 103–49; Pooja Rangan, “Auditing the Call Centre Voice: Accented Speech and Listening in Sonali Gulati’s *Nalini by Day, Nancy by Night*,” in *Vocal Projections: Voices in Documentary*, ed. Annabelle Honess Roe and Maria Pramaggiore (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 29–44.
67. Trinh, *When the Moon Waxes Red*, 60.
68. Readers may wish to consult two recent edited collections devoted to developing such a vocabulary: “Documentary Audibilities,” ed. Pooja Rangan and Genevieve Yue, special issue, *Discourse* 39, no. 3, and *Vocal Projections: Voices in Documentary*, ed. Annabelle Honess Roe and Maria Pramaggiore (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018). Several essays mentioned in this chapter are compiled in these volumes.
69. Leimbacher, “Hearing Voice(s),” 307; also see *ibid.*, 308–10.
70. See *ibid.*, 310–12; Patrik Sjöberg, “The Fundamental Lie: Lip Sync, Dubbing, Ventriloquism and the Othering of Voice in Documentary Media,” in *Vocal Projections: Voices in Documentary*, ed. Annabelle Honess Roe and Maria Pramaggiore (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 45–61; Pooja Rangan, “The Skin of the Voice: Acousmatic Illusions, Ventriloquial Listening,” in *Sound Objects*, ed. James A. Steintrager and Rey Chow (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), 130–48.
71. See Sarah Kessler, “The Voice of Mockumentary,” in *Vocal Projections: Voices in Documentary*, ed. Annabelle Honess Roe and Maria Pramaggiore (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 137–52.